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Tucker: Habeas Corpus: Capital Punishment for Petitioners Claiming "Actua

HABEAS CORPUS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR
PETITIONERS CLAIMING "ACTUAL INNOCENCE"?
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993)
James Thomas Tucker'
Petitioner was found guilty of murdering a police officer and was
sentenced to death in January 1982.' In July 1982, Petitioner pled guilty
to murdering a second police officer.2 Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed
his convictions and sentences in one direct appeal and three separate petitions for habeas corpus filed in the ten years following his conviction.3
Petitioner filed the petition for habeas corpus in the instant case in February 1992, alleging that he was "actually innocent" of the murders.4 Because of his innocence, petitioner contended that his execution would

violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.'
The District Court granted petitioner's request for a stay of execution to
allow him to present evidence of his innocence in state court.6 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the stay of execution, holding that a

claim of "actual innocence" without an independent constitutional violation in the course of the state proceedings was insufficient grounds on
which to grant habeas relief.7 The United States Supreme Court. granted

* This comment is dedicated to my wife, Susan, for her love and support in this endeavor.
1. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 856 (1993).
2. Id. at 857.
3. Id. at 858. In his first direct appeal, petitioner challenged the admission into evidence of
testimony of one of his victims and a bystander that identified him as the perpetrator of the second
murder. Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313, 317 ('rex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (affirming
petitioner's conviction for both murders and his death sentence), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
Shortly thereafter, petitioner was denied state habeas relief. See Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 858. Petitioner
then sought federal habeas relief, challenging the identifications as a denial of due process. Herrera v.
Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 945 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court's denial of federal habeas relief), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990). In December 1990 petitioner filed a second petition for state
habeas relief, claiming "actual innocence" based on two affidavits alleging that petitioner's dead brother, not the petitioner, murdered the two police officers. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 858.
4. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858. Petitioner claimed that the evidence in the affidavits, which was
not presented during his trial, proved his innocence regardless of the verdict reached in the trial. Id. at
860.
5. Id. at 858.
6. Id. at 859.
7. See Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1992). The Herrera court followed
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which held that "the existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus."
Id. at 317. Townsend was recently overruled on different grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.
Ct. 1715 (1992). See infra note 20.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 9
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

certiorari, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stayed petitioner's
execution.' The United States Supreme Court affirmed,9 and HELD,
petitioner's claim of "actual innocence" did not entitle him to federal
habeas relief absent an additional showing of a constitutional violation in
the underlying state criminal proceedings."
The common law writ of habeas corpus was intended as an "imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality."" The United States
Constitution recognizes habeas corpus relief, although the drafters did not
delineate specific requirements for obtaining the relief.'2 Federal habeas
corpus relief was extended to state prisoners in 1867.' Federal courts,
and district courts in particular, 4 were empowered to review state criminal proceedings in considering habeas petitions. 5
In spite of the considerable discretion given to federal courts to review

8. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
9. Id. at 870.
10. Id. at 869.
11. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 311.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). Habeas
corpus relief was also included in the initial grant of federal court jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
13. Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 373, 385-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2243 (1988)). The Judiciary Act of 1867 provided in relevant part:
[T]he several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts,
within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States ....
Id. The Judiciary Act of 1867 also granted power to federal courts to determine facts de novo and to
take testimony through a limited hearing:
The said court or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case,
by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties interested, and if it shall appear that
the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the constitution or laws of
the United States, he or she shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty.
Id. The present codification of the Judiciary Act of 1867 incorporates much of the same language,
specifying that, "[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988). For a detailed history of the development of federal
habeas corpus relief, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976).
14. The Supreme Court, Supreme Court Justices, circuit court judges, and district courts were
empowered to review petitions for federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). However, petitions for habeas corpus cannot be granted absent a
showing "that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988).
Remedies available in state courts are not deemed to be exhausted if the petitioner "has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)
(1988).
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facts in petitions for habeas relief, courts limited the remedy to cases
where the petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated. 6 Consequently, problems arose in habeas petitions where the petitioner failed to
allege constitutional violations independent of the facts. 7 Habeas petitions based on actual innocence, alleging that petitioners were innocent of
the crimes, were problematic because they often raised no constitutional
infirmities beyond the simple allegation that incarcerating or executing a

person actually innocent of a crime violated the person's constitutional
rights.' Therefore, it was not clear whether habeas claims of actual innocence could be used in the absence of a constitutional violation to allow a
federal district court to exercise its discretion and grant an evidentiary
hearing.'9
In Townsend v. Sain,2 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of when a court must hold an evidentiary hearing for a habeas
corpus petition. 2' In Townsend, petitioner's counsel objected to the intro-

duction of petitioner's confession at his murder trial, arguing that it was
obtained by coercion.' The trial court held a hearing outside the presence
of the jury on petitioner's motion to suppress the confession.2 The parties presented a substantial amount of conflicting testimony on how the

16. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923). In Moore, the Court overruled the district
court's denial of petitioners' writ of habeas corpus. Id. In doing so. Justice Holmes emphasized that
while "mistakes of law" were not to be corrected by habeas corpus interference, actual interference
with the course of justice (amounting to a departure from due process of law) was properly corrected
by a grant of habeas corpus. Id. Justice Holmes further stated, "{Wlhat we have to deal with (on
habeas review) is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional right[s] have been preserved." Id. at 87-88.
17. See id. at 87-88.
18. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992) (habeas petitioner alleged that
he was actually "innocent of the death penalty" because evidence that had not been submitted to the
jury would have made him ineligible for the death penalty under Louisiana law).
19. There seems to be little disagreement over the proposition that the execution of an "actually
innocent person" would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 (stating that the
Court may assume that the execution of an actually innocent defendant would be unconstitutional).
20. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Court partially overruled Townsend in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
112 S. Ct. 1715, 1717 (1992). Keeney held that a "cause-and-prejudice" standard rather than
Townsend's "deliberate bypass" standard is the correct standard for excusing a habeas petitioner's
failure to develop a material fact in state court proceedings. Id. at 1717-18. Keeney's overruling, however, does not affect the propositions for which Townsend is cited in this comment.
21. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 297.
22. Id. at 295-96. Petitioner was a heroin addict who was accustomed to taking injections every
three to five hours. Id. at 297. Immediately after his arrest for robbery and murder, petitioner denied
committing any crimes. Id. at 298. After petitioner had been detained for several hours, he began to
suffer symptoms of narcotics withdrawal. Id. A doctor summoned by the police to alleviate petitioner's
withdrawal symptoms injected petitioner with phenobarbital and hyoscine. Id. Petitioner claimed that
the hyoscine had qualities of a "truth serum." Id. at 298, 302. Shortly after being administered the
injection, petitioner confessed to the murder. Id. at 299.
23. Id. at 296.
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confession was obtained.24 Without making any findings of fact or writing an opinion stating the grounds of its decision, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion to suppress and admitted petitioner's confession into
evidence.'
Based in part on the confession,26 the jury found petitioner guilty,
and petitioner was sentenced to death.27 The Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed,28 and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.29 In subsequent petitions for state and federal habeas relief, the
petitioner continued to raise allegations that the State had obtained his
confession by coercion.3" Each court that considered the allegations, however, ruled against the petitioner. None of the reviewing courts conducted
evidentiary hearings, stated findings of fact, or wrote opinions based on
petitioner's claim of coercion.3" The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari for petitioner's federal habeas claim32 and held that an evidentiary hearing was compelled because of the absence of findings of fact in
the record on the issue of coercion.3"
The Townsend Court observed that habeas relief was different from

24. Id. at 301-02. For a discussion of petitioner's allegations of how the confession was obtained,
see supra note 22.
25. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 302.
26. Additional evidence was presented that connected petitioner to the crime. A witness testified
that he saw the petitioner walking down a street near the murder scene with a brick in his hand. Id. at
304. The witness was placed on probation for robbery after testifying. Id. On appeal, two justices of
the Illinois Supreme Court found this testimony to be "inherently incredible." People v. Townsend,
141 N.E.2d 729, 739 (Ill.) (Schaefer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1957), and cert. denied, 358 U.S. 887 (1958).
In addition, a pathologist testified that the victim's death was caused by a blow to his head.
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 304. However, the United States Supreme Court found that none of the
pathologist's testimony in the record supported that the blow was inflicted by a brick, id., contrary to
the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court. Townsend, 141 N.E.2d at 737.
27. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 296.
28. Townsend, 141 N.E.2d at 729.
29. Townsend v. Illinois, 358 U.S. 887 (1958); Townsend v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 850 (1957).
30. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 296-97.
31. Id. Petitioner's state habeas claim was dismissed by the Cook County Criminal Court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 296. Petitioner's federal habeas claim was dismissed by the district court solely on the basis of the pleadings, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id.; see Townsend v. Sain, 265 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1958), vacated, 359 U.S. 64
(1959). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a
determination of whether an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's coercion claim was necessary.
Townsend v. Sain, 359 U.S. 64 (1959). On remand, the district court dismissed the petition without a
hearing, holding the record demonstrated that petitioner's confession had been voluntarily given.
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 297. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, United States ex rel. Townsend v. Sain, 276
F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
district court is limited to the undisputed portions of the record in determining whether petitioner was
deprived of his constitutional rights. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 297.
32. Townsend v. Sain, 365 U.S. 866 (1961).
33. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 321.
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appellate court review because a court reviewing a habeas petition was
expected "to test [the facts alleged] by way of an original civil proceeding" and was not confined to the record. 4 If necessary, a court considering a habeas claim would have plenary power "to receive evidence and try
the facts anew."35 A hearing was mandatory where serious procedural
errors were made36 or where facts were in dispute and the habeas peti-

tioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing.37 The Court

ruled, however, that the existence of newly discovered evidence alone

would not warrant federal habeas corpus relief.38 Deprivation of a constitutional right independent of the new evidence or facts in dispute had to
be alleged.39 The Townsend Court gave district courts considerable discretion in determining if a hearing.should be held absent a strong showing
of constitutional deprivations.' The Court did so despite concerns that
such discretion would lead to frivolous claims for evidentiary hearings.'
The Supreme Court again addressed the discretion of district courts to
review state court convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings in
Jackson v. Virginia.42 The Jackson Court held that due process required
the State to prove evidence of essential elements of criminal offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt in federal habeas proceedings.43 The Court
cautioned, however, that a petitioner would only be entitled to habeas
34. Id. at 311-12.
35. Id. at 312.
36. Id. at 316.
37. Id. at 312. The court elaborated that an evidentiary hearing must be granted under the following circumstances:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears
that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. These circumstances have be~n substantially incorporated into federal law outlining procedures for habeas relief for state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
38. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added).
39. Id. The Court stated that if a habeas application alleged newly discovered evidence which
could not reasonably have been presented at trial, then an evidentiary hearing was warranted. Id. Such
evidence, however, "must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention." Id.
40. Id. at 318. "In every case [the district judgel has the power, constrained only by his sound
discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant's constitutional claim." Id.
41. Id. at 319. The court stated that the balance between increased numbers of hearings that could
swamp the dockets and a strict limitation on hearings that could result in uncorrected constitutional
errors necessarily had to rest with district judges on the "front line." Id.
42. 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (affirming the dismissal of a federal habeas petition by a state prisoner
convicted of first degree murder who had alleged that the prosecution had failed to prove premeditation).
43. See id. at 324; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (holding that a juvenile
accused of theft was constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
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relief if "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Additionally, in considering the proof of guilt, district courts were limited to reviewing "record evidence. ' 45 The Jackson
Court made no provision for nonrecord evidence such as newly discovered
evidence. 6 The Court stated that courts reviewing habeas petitions were
not to determine if they agreed with the findings of fact in the record, but
only to appraise whether constitutional error had occurred. 47 The Jackson
Court held that in the absence of constitutional error independent of
nonrecord evidence, a district court could not entertain a habeas petition."
In Sawyer v. Whitley,49 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a petitioner could bring a federal habeas claim alleging new evidence of actual innocence after abusive or successive use of the writ.5 In
Sawyer, petitioner had unsuccessfully sought state and federal habeas relief
in an earlier appeal.5 The Court held that a federal court may hear the
merits of the successive claims only if the failure to hear the claims would
constitute a "miscarriage of justice." 2
With this holding, the Sawyer Court gave the actual innocence exception a very narrow scope. 3 The Court emphasized that in order for a
court to reach the merits of a habeas claim, a petitioner would have to
meet a more rigorous showing in a successive habeas petition than in his
first habeas petition. 4 This increased standard required a petitioner to
show "by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,
no reasonable juror would find [the petitioner] eligible for the death pen-

44. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.
45. See id.
46. See id. The restriction to "record evidence" seems to be in accord with the principle that a
habeas petitioner afforded a fair trial and convicted appears before the court without the benefit of the
presumption of innocence. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860; cf. Ross v. Moffitt. 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)
("The purpose of the trial stage from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from
a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
47. Cf. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323 ("Congress in [section] 2254 has selected the federal district
courts as precisely the forums that are responsible for determining whether state convictions have been
secured in accord with federal constitutional law.").
48. Id. at 320-21.
49. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
50. Id. at 2517. Petitioner had been convicted and sentenced to death for a murder in which the
victim was set on fire after being beaten and scalded with boiling water. Id. at 2515.
51. Sawyer v. Butler, 848 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming the dismissal of the petitions for
habeas corpus), aff'd on reh'g, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aft'd, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
52. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2518. The Court limited the instances in which courts would reach the
merits of habeas claims because of its concern for finality in state convictions and the cost of reviewing habeas claims. Id.
53. Id. at 2519.
54. Id. at 2522.
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alty." The Sawyer Court held that the petitioner failed to meet that burden in his second request for federal habeas relief. 6
In the instant case, the Supreme Court restricted actual innocence
habeas petitions even further than it had in Sawyer. The Court stated that

the threshold for making an actual innocence claim was "extraordinarily
high."5" The majority imposed the increased burden on habeas petitioners

out of a need for finality in appeals of capital cases and to lessen the
tremendous burden that the states face in retrying cases based on stale evi-

dence. 8 The majority did not specify what factual evidence a petitioner
must present to meet this threshold, but held that the petitioner in the instant case fell far short of the standard. 9

The majority in the instant case assumed that if a petitioner made a
strong showing of innocence after his conviction and no relief was available through state courts, his execution would be unconstitutional and
federal habeas relief would be warranted.' Factual evidence of innocence
alone, however, would not be enough to support a constitutional claim.6t
The instant Court held that actual innocence was only a "gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitu-

tional claim considered on the merits."'62

The petitioner in the instant case did not base his habeas petition on
evidence produced at trial or on a separate constitutional claim.6' There-

55. Id. at 2523.
56. Id. at 2524. The Court further held that even if the jury had been shown petitioner's newly
acquired evidence, it could not be said that a reasonable juror would not have found all of the "aggravating factors" required for petitioner to be eligible for the death penalty. Id. The court therefore found
that petitioner failed to demonstrate actual innocence and affirmed the dismissal of his second habeas
petition. Id.
57. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 869.
58. Id.
59. Id. The majority found the petitioner's new evidence to be particularly suspect. Id. at 869-70.
With the exception of one affidavit, the affidavits petitioner offered were hearsay. Id. at 869. The
petitioner did not offer a satisfactory explanation for why the affidavits were not provided earlier,
before the person whom the petitioner alleged perpetrated the murders had died. Id. In addition, contrary to the allegations of innocence in the affidavits, the petitioner had pled guilty to one of the murders. Id. Finally, the affidavits themselves contained several factual inconsistencies. Id. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the dissent, took the majority to task for assuming the role of the district court
by ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in the affidavits. Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting).
Justice Blackmun stated that the affidavits raised sufficient factual questions to warrant an evidentiary
hearing. Id.
60. Id. at 869.
61. Id. at 862. The majority noted that the Constitution was silent on requirements for new trials
based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at 864. The Supreme Court placed a two-year limit on all
criminal cases for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at 865. The majority emphasized that only nine states had no time limits on motions for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. Id. at 866.
62. Id. at 862.
63. Id. at 858-59.
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fore, by applying the requirements for habeas review stated in Jackson,'
the majority held that the district court could not conduct an evidentiary
hearing on petitioner's evidence.65 Furthermore, the majority found that
granting the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his claim of actual innocence would give him additional process not available under state law.'
According to the majority, Texas' refusal to grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his actual innocence claim did not amount to a violation
of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Due process does not require the elimination of every possibility of convicting an
innocent person; to hold otherwise would make enforcement of the criminal law impossible.68 The majority emphasized that the petitioner was not
left without a forum to present his claim, since he could file a request for
executive clemency under Texas law.69 The majority noted that clemency
"is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.""0 The instant Court stated that constitutional and statutory provisions for clemency in the thirty-six states that
authorize capital punishment provide a sufficient "fail-safe" for wrongfully
convicted persons.7
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter in his dissent,
emphasized that nothing was "more shocking to the conscience, than to
execute a person who is actually innocent."72 Justice Blackmun criticized
the majority for characterizing petitioner's claim of actual innocence as a
procedural, rather than a substantive due process issue.73 The problem

64. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
65. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
66. Id. at 864. Texas law requires that an evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence be held no more than 30 days after the imposition or suspension of sentence. TEX. R. APP.
PROC. 31(a)(1) (1992).
67. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866. The majority noted that criminal due process was only found
lacking where it " 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Id. at 864 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
202 (1977) (holding that due process does not require that the prosecution prove the nonexistence of
all affirmative defenses to elements of criminal offenses)).
68. Id. at 860 (citing Patterson,432 U.S. at 208).
69. Id. at 866.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 868.
72. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). But see id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 'shocks' the
dissenters' consciences, perhaps they should doubt ... the usefulness of 'conscience-shocking' as a
legal test.").
73. Id. at 878. Compare id. at 864 n.6 (the majority, stating that "[tihe question before us, then,
is ... whether [due process] entitles petitioner to judicial review of his 'actual innocence' claim") with
id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the dissent, stating that "[w]e really are being asked to decide
whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence").
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with procedural protections, according to Justice Blackmun, was that they
sometimes failed.74 Justice Blackmun found that the possibility of executive clemency to correct procedural failures did not adequately satisfy the
requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.75 Therefore, the
dissent stated that executing a person who is actually innocent, but who
was afforded procedural due process in the criminal proceedings, would
clearly violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments.76
Justice Blackmun's dissent suggested that federal district courts should
retain considerable discretion in determining whether a petitioner's evidence of actual innocence warrants an evidentiary hearing.7 Following
the holding in Townsend, Justice Blackmun stated that when a petition
raises factual questions and a full and fair hearing had not been provided,
a district court must hold a hearing.78 The dissent would have required a
petitioner to present evidence of his actual innocence demonstrating that
"he probably is innocent."79 Therefore, Justice Blackmun would have
remanded the instant case to the district court to determine whether the
petitioner had demonstrated he was "probably innocent."8
The instant Court reaffirmed the guidelines set forth in Townsend of
when an evidentiary hearing is mandatory in a habeas petition.8 A petition alleging evidence bearing upon the constitutionality of the petitioner's
detention, on which the petitioner had not received a full and fair hearing,
requires a hearing by the district court.Y However, the instant Court retreated from Townsend to the extent that it limited the discretion of district
courts to consider newly discovered evidence without a clear, independent
constitutional violation." Evidence of actual innocence cannot be joined

74. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 881. Justice Blackmnun strongly criticized this approach, saying that "[i]f the exercise of
a legal right turns on 'an act of grace' [the prospect of executive clemency], then we no longer live
under a government of laws." Id. (referring to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ("The
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men.")).
76. Id. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 883.
78. Id. at 881-82 (citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313).
79. Id. at 882.
80. Id. at 884. The majority strongly criticized the "probable innocence" approach. Id. at 861-62.
Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that it would presumably require the district court to retry the petitioner

"10 years after his first trial, not because of any constitutional violation which had occurred at the first
trial, but simply because of a belief that in light of petitioner's new found evidence a jury might find

him not guilty at a second trial:' Id. at 862.
81. Id. at 860.
82. Id. (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 317).
83. Id. at 862. Compare id. at 873 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("But even if the District Court did
hold that further federal proceedings were warranted, surely it abused its discretion. The affidavits do
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with a claim that under the Eighth Amendment, the execution of an innocent person would be unconstitutional 4 Once a defendant has been convicted, the presumption of innocence disappears,"5 and the execution
would be of a legally guilty person. 6 According to the instant Court, absent a constitutional claim independent of the evidence of actual innocence, any hearing granted by the district court would constitute an abuse
of discretion.87
While the instant Court indicated its reluctance to defer to the discretion of district court judges,88 it gave considerable deference to the states
to determine how much criminal process the Constitution requires.89 Historical practices that have given states discretion to decide when new trials
should be granted led the majority to conclude that no constitutional deprivation arises when a state does not exercise its discretion.' So long as a
prisoner has been convicted after a "constitutionally adequate trial," federal courts should not intervene to prevent an execution.9 A prisoner can
presumably present a showing of actual innocence in a petition for executive clemency in the state. 92
In its analysis, the instant Court emphasized the underlying need to
streamline the appeals process in capital cases.93 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor noted that "[a]t some point in time, the State's interest in
finality must outweigh the prisoner's interest in yet another round of litigation. In [the instant] case, that point was well short of eight years."' In
order to avoid a flood of frivolous claims of innocence,95 the instant

not reveal a likelihood of actual innocence ....The abuse of discretion is particularly egregious given
the procedural posture. The District Court actually entered an order staying the execution.") with
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318 ("In all other cases [other than when a hearing is mandatory] where the
material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district
judge ....There is every reason to be confident that federal district judges, mindful of their delicate
role in the maintenance of proper federal-state relations, will not abuse that discretion.").
84. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 862-63.
85. See supra note 46.
86. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 860.
87. Id. at 860. 862-63.
88. Id. at 861-62.
89. Id. at 864. Deference to the states on when a new trial must be held is probably the result of
the silence of the Constitution on the issue. See id.
90. Id. at 866; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
91. Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 871 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 866-68; see id. at 871 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that after a constitutionally
adequate trial, a prisoner's sole remedy is executive clemency).
93. Id. at 869.
94. Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. The majority stated that in considering the petition in the instant case, it was aware "that
defendants often abuse new trial motions 'as a method of delaying enforcement of just sentences.' "
Id. at 869 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946)). Chief Justice Rehnquist also
noted that, "[flew rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal
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Court set the threshold for federal habeas relief very high.96 Justice
O'Connor agreed with this holding by reasoning that without requiring
such a strong showing, a meritorious claim of actual innocence would
likely be buried by worthless claims.97 In contrast, Justice Blackmun's
dissent expressed deep concern over the majority's desire for expediency
in capital cases and the "Court's obvious eagerness to do away with any
restriction on the States' power to execute whomever and however they
please.""0 In his criticism of the majority's approach, Justice Blackmun
stated that "[tihe execution of a person who can show that he is innocent
comes perilously close to simple murder."'
The instant case renders it extremely difficult for a federal habeas
petitioner to obtain an evidentiary hearing based on actual innocence when
such a hearing is not mandatory."re Indeed, Justice Scalia noted in his
concurring opinion that he hoped the Court would not have to address the
actual innocence question again "since it is improbable that evidence of
innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires would fail to produce
an executive pardon.''. The instant case effectively limits federal habeas
review to procedural infirmities in the underlying criminal proceedings."
Under the rule articulated in the instant case, absent a showing of an
independent constitutional violation, a habeas petitioner claiming actual
innocence will probably be limited to seeking state judicial relief in the
form of either a right to a new hearing, a trial based on the new evidence,
or executive clemency.' If the State denies relief, an actually innocent
person, properly afforded procedural due process in a criminal trial, may
be left with no forum to present newly discovered evidence of his innocence."° It is therefore possible to imagine a situation in which the "failsafe" of executive clemency °" fails and an innocent person is executed."°

habeas review of free-standing claims of actual innocence:' Id. at 861.
96. Id. at 869.

97. Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
99. Id.

100. Id. at 860-62; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
101. Herrera,113 S. CL at 875 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
102. Id. at 869; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
103. See Herrera, 113 S.Ct. at 869.
104. The majority in the instant case stated that denial of petitioner's habeas claim of actual innocence did not leave the petitioner without a forum to raise his claim, since under Texas law he could
file for executive clemency. Id. at 866. Inferentially, if executive clemency was not exercised, then
presumably the petitioner would be left without a forum to raise his claim of actual innocence. See
supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
105. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868.
106. There is substantial disagreement between the majority and dissent on how fallible executive
clemency is. Id. at n.15. Both the majority and the dissent point to the same study on the effectiveness
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The instant case indicates the extent to which the Supreme Court has
narrowed "the avenues of relief available to federal habeas petitioners
seeking redress of their constitutional claims. ''1
"" Justice Scalia demonstrated this narrow view, suggesting that habeas corpus could not ensure
that innocent people are never executed.0 8 But the instant Court seems
to err too much on the side of judicial expediency, at the expense of ensuring full due process to a habeas petitioner before execution.'" The
wide discretion the Townsend Court gave to district court judges in deciding the necessity of evidentiary hearings". seems preferable to the approach in the instant case which relies on state remedies such as executive
clemency.'' Federal habeas relief is intended to provide a remedy for a
prisoner who is deprived of liberty in violation of the Constitution." 2
Yet by narrowing the scope of habeas review, the instant case has effectively increased the likelihood that an actually innocent person may be
executed, which even the majority in the instant case recognizes would be
unconstitutional."' This price for judicial expediency may be too high.

of clemency. Id. (citing Hugo A. Bedeau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987)). Compare Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868 (the majority,
stating that "history is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned
in the wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence") with id. at 876 n.1 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (the dissent, stating that the "study has concluded that 23 innocent people have been
executed in the United States in this century, including one as recently as 1984").
107. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2529 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun further observes
that "[this term] has witnessed, as well, the execution of two victims of the 'new habeas ....... "Id.
108. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 875. Justice Scalia notes:
I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present Court to admit
publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of
an innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has
traditionally deemed adequate.
Id.
109. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 67-71, 88-92 and accompanying text.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
113. Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 869; see also id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree
with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."); id. at 875 (White, J., concurring) ("[A] persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after
trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly
discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner .... ").
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